Suchergebnisse

In this paper we look at the impact of broad policy reforms on the levels of corruption. We use a structural break approach to identify country-specific time periods in which significant shifts in corruption levels take place. We then correlate these times of change with a set of covariates with specific focus on the impact of democratization, and trade and equity market liberalization. We find robust support for the hypothesis that episodes of reduction in corruption levels tend to be correlated with democratization and equity market liberalization. Adapted from the source document.

Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an "authoritarian bargain" by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision‐making in non‐democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields implications for empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non‐democratic states between 1975 and 1999 generally confirm the predictions of the authoritarian‐bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.